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ABSTRACT
During the East Asian Financial crisis in particular, the IMF has been criticized of
promoting international cooperation because of the supervised enforcement of its rules. The
purpose of this research is to find out how the IMF responded to the East Asian debt crisis and
whether or not its responses were the best possible responses to this crisis. Through my research,
I talked about the causes of the East Asian financial crisis, the role of the IMF in the international
monetary system, and if the IMF responses to Thailand, South Korea and Indonesia were the best
responses or not. After analyzing the IMF responses in this crisis, I found that the IMF policies need to
be reformed in order to monitor and prevent future financial crises spill-over effects at the global and
regional levels. I will analyzed 5 scholarly journals on the financial crisis in East Asia, 3 scholarly

articles on the role of IMF in the East Asia financial crisis, and 1 novel called POLITICS IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA DEMOCRACY OR LESS by William Case.
INTRODUCTION
Several financial crises have occurred in the world economy through the last decades.
Some examples include the East Asian financial Crisis of 1997, the Latin American debt crisis of
1994-95, the Russian crisis of 1998, and the Brazilian crisis of 1998-99 which spread out to other
areas also known as the “contagion effect”. During these crises, the International Monetary
Funds (IMF) has been involved and known as a crisis manager. The IMF was created in 1945
after World War 2. The IMF is charged with overseeing the system of exchange rates and
international payments that enables countries of the world and their citizens to buy goods and
services from each other. The IMF played an important role in ensuring exchange rate stability,
encouraging its member countries to eliminate exchange restrictions that hindered trade,
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operating a system of fixed exchange in which all member countries’ currencies are pegged to
the dollar, and by acting as a lender of last resort when a member country faced an economic
crisis. But, the institution (IMF) raison d’etre collapsed after 1971 when the major currencies
moved to a floating exchange rate system. Despite the IMF success in accomplishing its job in
other crises, the IMF has been seriously criticized during the East Asian financial crisis of
promoting international cooperation because of the supervised enforcement of its rules. The
advent of the East Asian debt crisis marked a major turning point for the IMF’s fortunes. Based
on this thought, this paper proposes a detailed analysis of the causes of the East Asian financial
crisis, and the role of the IMF during the financial crisis. Finally, this research paper will answer
the question whether or not the IMF fulfilled its mission during the East Asian crisis and if the
IMF responses were the best responses possible.

LITTERATURE REVIEW
Since 1990 there was a rapid buildup of short term external debt in the weak Asian
financial market. Domestic banks were borrowing at a high rate, mostly in US dollars. Even
though in a booming economy this does not pose a problem, the situation in the Asian economy
was very different. The weaknesses of the Asian financial system were at the root of the East
Asian financial crisis. The economies of Asian countries were performing well up until they
experienced a huge and rapid capital inflow of foreign financial investments which exposed them
to a financial crisis. Despite such success theories, Khan, Islam and Ahmed (2005) pointed out
that, economists predicted that these economies will run into a phase of declining growth or
diminishing productivity. The financial crisis has been seen by many other economists as one

Published by Cornerstone: A Collection of Scholarly and Creative Works for Minnesota State University, Mankato, 2013

3

Journal of Undergraduate Research at Minnesota State University, Mankato, Vol. 13 [2013], Art. 9

event which started in the middle of 1997 and had a continued effect until the end of
1998.nTherefore, economists depicted the crisis in two different stages. The first stage of the
panic started in July 1997 and affected the “East Asian Tigers”: Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines
and Singapore. The second stage of the crisis started in October, 1997 affecting Indonesia, Hong
Kong, Japan. This second stage of the crisis also affected the world’s 11th largest economy,
South Korea, and brought down their economy in December of 1997. The crisis was triggered
first by Thailand’s large current account deficit and second by Japanese banks which are the
largest lenders in Asia and one of Asia’s main creditors. The real seeds of the financial crisis,
however, were sown during the early 1990s in the aftermath of the real estate1 and stock market2
bubble which severely damaged the balance sheets of Japanese commercial banks. When the
crisis hit South Korea and Thailand, the Japanese commercial banks withdrew quickly their loans
from Thai banks in 1997 and reduced their exposure in other Asian countries due to their need to
avoid losses and to protect their capital base. (King, 2001, p.439) argued that, “Japanese banks
had been severely weakened by the collapse of the real estate and stock market bubble in Japan
in 1990. As the largest lenders in Asia, Japanese banks signaled the change in sentiment to other
foreign commercial banks who also withdrew their loans. These capital outflows triggered
currency devaluation in Thailand in mid-1997, but not in Korea until late 1997, due to the
different exchange rate regimes in these countries”. This financial crisis had a huge impact on the
world global economy causing stock markets to fall in the United States, Europe, Brazil and
Russia and all over the world.

1

Real estate bubble is a run-up in housing prices or values fueled by market demand and speculation

2

Stock market bubble is when speculators and investors are pushing the overall value of a market beyond
its proper or normal value
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The earliest stages of the East Asian financial crisis started with the “Asian economic
miracle”. The Asian economic miracle is defined as the attraction of huge foreign capital into
Asian countries (Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Philippines and South Korea) which
maintained a high rate of return due to their remarkable rate of economic growth and progress.
During the Asian economic miracle, non-state actors (institutional investors, foreign banks) in
particular, gained control over the East Asian states capital flow and started making huge
investment decisions that full the Asian economy. King (2001) said that institutional investors
were professional firms which direct flows of investment and credit on behalf of savers. This
category included commercial banks, portfolio investors in equity and debts, and foreign direct
investment by national multinational enterprises. But by 1990, the “Asian Tigers” (Thailand,
Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and South Korea) were struggling with collapsing currencies,
banks failure, and plunging stocks and assets markets.
However, the root and depth of the Asian financial crisis can be explained through a
theory called, the ‘moral hazard’3 theory. According to this theory, the supply of bank credits to
borrowers exceeded by far the existent investment opportunities without government guarantee.
Khan et al. (2005) argued that financial intermediaries such as banks, stock exchange, insurance
companies had excessive risky lending practices which sent the asset prices skyrocketing and
had a false impression of having the government guarantee. Bank credit to the East Asian Tigers
expanded rapidly from 1991 to 1996 at a rate of 10-30 percent per year. International bank loans
to the Asian Tigers doubled from $121 billion to $261 billion. In South Korea and Indonesia for
example, government urged banks to lend money to politically-connected businesses and large

3

Moral hazard refers to a situation where economic actors such as business investors, foreign firms make
profit-maximizing but inefficient investments decisions because they are able to avoid costs associated
with their conducts.
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infrastructure projects. So when the bubble4 burst, a financial crisis was set in motion and went
out of hands. After researching, economists found that two types of moral hazard were at work
during the crisis: the Domestic moral hazard and the International moral hazard. Domestically,
banks were encouraged to borrow short term loans from abroad which were invested in risky
domestic ventures under the belief that these investments carried government guarantees.
Internationally, foreign borrowers lend to Asian borrowers at an increase risks with the
assumptions that they will be protected by an international bail-out in case there is financial
crisis. Unfortunately, that was not the case when the crisis exploded. Based on the moral hazard
theory, investors thought that they have made wise investments decisions by investing in Asian
countries without even accessing the externalities5 created by these investments. So when the
financial crisis hit Asia, investors were the one who beard most the costs of the moral hazard
because the borrowers could not afford to pay back their credits. In addition to that, the
borrowers did not have any government guarantees that will ensure a bail-out in case of a
financial collapse. As a result both investors and borrowers could not avoid the consequences of
the crisis.
Despite the moral hazard theory, crony-capitalism6 was a cause of the East Asian
financial crisis. Crony-capitalism was highly emphasized in Indonesian and South Korea. The
corrupt relationship between the conglomerates and financial institutions under Suharto’s rule
contributed to the spread of the Economic crisis in Indonesia. Khan et al. (2005) mentioned that,
these corrupt relationships between the conglomerates and financial institutions sow the seeds of

4

A bubble is an economic cycle characterized by rapid expansion followed by a contraction.
Externalities are positive or negative consequences of an economic activity that are experienced by
unrelated third parties.
6
Crony capitalism is a term used to describe a capitalist society based on the close relationships between
businessmen and the state
5
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the trouble and showed symptoms of “crony capitalism”. So in an atmosphere of tied and
specific relationship between government and favorite companies, efficient market neither
flourished nor developed.
The East Asian Financial crisis broke out on July 2nd 1997 when Thailand devaluated the
baht by abandoning its exchange rate peg with the US dollar due to other foreign speculators and
institutional investors. Since 1990, Thailand’s current account deficit (the sum of the country’s
trade deficit and the interest on its foreign obligation) exceeded four percent of Thailand’s GDP,
implying that Thailand had to attract more foreign capital each year to stop the account deficit
decline. Unfortunately, Thailand’s account deficit ended up in a steady decline when foreign and
local investors became aware that the borrowers would be incapable to pay their debts and
therefore pulled out their investments. Even though Thailand’s large current account deficit
persisted since the 1990s, investors still believed that Thailand might be different because much
of its capital inflow came as a direct investment instead of an indirect investment by Japanese
manufacturing firms and banks. Investors also derived confidence in Thailand’s high savings rate
and large government budget surplus.
But, the primary reason that kept foreign investments coming to Thailand and local funds
staying was the combination of high interest rates on Thai Baht deposits and a promise by the
government that the baht’s value would remain fixed at 25 baht/1 dollar. Unfortunately, the
baht’s fixed value could not be sustained any longer because the Japanese yen declined by 35
percent relative to the dollar. And since Japan was the major trading partner of Thailand, the rise
in the value of the dollar implied the rise in the value of the baht which made Thai products more
expensive and less competitive in the international market. This situation led foreign speculators
to sell the Baths. According to Feldstein (1998), the Thai government secretly bought the baht to
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support its value but eventually had to give up because they couldn’t keep the promise of
sustaining the baht. In 1996, the Thai stock market and the real estate market both declined. In
order to assist distressed Thai finance institutions burdened by bad property loans, the
government injected money into the Thai economy, imposed capital controls and forced their
minister of finance to resign after failing to save Finance One, the largest Thai finance company.
King (2001) argued that the finance minister paid a visit to the central bank and discovered that
almost all of the country's $30 billion in foreign exchange reserves had been committed in
forward contracts, while another $8 billion had been used by the central bank's Financial
Institutions Development Fund to prop up struggling finance companies. Therefore, the finance
minister did not have any choice but to renege on the government's promise to re-capitalize
Finance One with public money, by allowing it to fail. Foreign and domestic investors as well as
commercial banks saw this action as a betrayal of the government’s promise that their
investments would be safe and protected. The devaluation of the baht and the broken promises of
the government over Finance One enabled foreign institutional investors to recheck the risks of
investments in that particular region of Asia.
As a consequence to the Thai finance collapse, the dominoes began to fall. Japanese
brokers such as Sanyo Securities and their largest security firms such as Yamaichi Securities and
Hokkaido Takushoku bank filed bankruptcy. On the other hand, the crisis started expanding in
Asia due to poor domestic conditions which forced Japanese banks to look for more profitable
investments abroad. Japanese banks funded overseas loans and expanded their loans to Japanese
manufacturers who moved their production facilities abroad in order to remain competitive in the
international market and raise the value of the yen. Japanese banks were also the most powerful
and largest suppliers of bank credit in Asia with $275 billion of loans. This strong financial
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position gave Japanese banks a key position in the market making them the key marginal lender.
Being the marginal lender in the Asian market, Japanese banks reconsidered the risks of lending
with the trouble that emerged in Thailand and at home. As a result, they could not afford to lose
money and therefore stopped extending loans to Thailand and started withdrawing money from
other Asian countries. Other foreign banks responded in the same fashion by withdrawing huge
amounts of money from the Asian 5 which had a huge impact on the Asian economy. “By June
1998, commercial loans outstanding to the Asian-5 had declined to $210 billion, an outflow over
12 months of $65 billion or 7 percent of pre-shock GDP. Thailand lost $23 billion or 33 percent
of its foreign loans; Indonesia lost $8 billion or 14 percent and Malaysia lost $6 billion or 20
percent” (King, 2001, p. 449). Japanese companies were then forced to reduce their exposure in
the Asia financial market due to the failing banking system, the decline of their equity and a
rising number of bankruptcies within their economy which permitted the crisis to spill over to
other Asian countries.
The spreading or the “contagion effect” of the crisis to Indonesia, Malaysia, and
Philippines was also based on the fact that investors began to be worried about these countries
large account deficits, the increase ratio of their foreign debt to local GDP, and the decline of
their trade competitiveness. The Thai Baht collapse forced the peso in the Philippines to float,
while Malaysia allowed its national currency the ringgit to downgrade. Due to this situation,
Singapore let its currency depreciate forcing its neighboring country Indonesia to depreciate the
rupiah on 14th August 1997. However, trade linkages among these countries tied their economies
together which enabled the transmission of the crisis from one country to another. Also,
economic changes are more likely to happen in a region if the countries of that region share the
same macroeconomic policies, have similar financial institutions, and are connected to each
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other through a pattern of mutual trade and investment. The weaknesses of the Indonesian
economy that made it vulnerable to an attack on its currency were similar to Thailand’s economy
weaknesses. These weaknesses were: rising external liabilities, private sector debt, poor loan
quality, lack in the government’s ability to solve problems, excessive amounts of foreign
investment, and overvalued currency pegged to the US dollar. According to Khan et al. (2005)
“A nominal devaluation in the currency of one of the countries may put its trading partners, who
are exporting similar goods to a common market, at a corn petitive disadvantage. For example,
with the devaluation of the Baht, exports from its regional partners were at a
disadvantage”(p.173). Although the Indonesian government attempted to stabilize the situation
by defending the currency, using the Central Bank reserves, the situation continued to deteriorate
due to the link between these economies. Nicola, Bello, and Mallhotra (1998) said that even though
the Central Bank attempted to rescue the currency by raising interest rates; the rupiah hit the
lowest value of 2682 rupiah/1 dollar, from a level of 2400 rupiah/1 dollar. Each market was then
forced to abandon its fixed exchange rate policy and let the international market determine and
fix their currency value. An analysis of trade flow among these countries is central to exploring
the role of trade links in the spreading of the crisis
It is noteworthy that the Indonesian economy was embedded in a nepotistic system of
money lending and deal making. Big project contracts were awarded to President Suharto’s
offspring and therefore benefited only the people of his family and not the population at large.
According to Nicola Bullard et al. (1998), “Estimates of the family fortune vary wildly, from $6
billion to $40 billion, making it one’s of the world’s largest family fortunes. Foreign companies
hoping to do businesses in Indonesia often hire Suharto section scions as consultants to grease
the wheels”(p. 515). The only exit option for Thailand and Indonesia was to contract their
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current account deficit by increasing exports and reducing imports which required a reduction in
public and private consumption and investments. They also found out that they needed to shrink
their current account deficit by increasing exports and reducing imports. As the last resort,
Indonesia and Thailand decided to refer to the traditional IMF cure tailored to each country. This
particular cure is the combination of reduced government spending, imposed higher taxes, and
tighter credit.
Unlike the other Asian countries, the Korean situation was much different. Three main
factors appeared to be the causes of the crisis in South Korea. Bullard et al. (1998) argued that,
the first factor was the government failure to invest significantly in research and development,
the second was the massive trade blitz unleashed on South Korea by the US and the third was
Korean membership to the OECD, which forced the country to adopt a more liberal stance
towards foreign capital and finance. These were the factors that exposed the Korean government
incapacity to prevent market failure which had been the main driving force of the country’s
economic success during the ‘miracle decades’7. The Korean high-speed industrialization
framework during the miracle decades was a strategic relationship between the private sector and
the government. The government was picking specific industries which provided them with
subsidized credit through a government directed banking system and protected them from
international competition. The state nurtured industrial conglomerates called ‘Chaebols’8 such as
Samsung, Hyundai, LG that it pushed out into the international market. This strategy was really
successful in the 1970s and became the foundation of South Korea industrialization and export
growth. In the early 1990s, the tide turned against South and everything fell apart. Instead of

7

Miracle decades is a term used in reference to the highly developed economy growth of Singapore,
Hong Kong, South Korean and Taiwan from 1960 to 1990
8
Chaebols: big industrial conglomerates created by the state
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pouring money into R&D to turn out high-value added commodities and develop more
sophisticated production technologies, South Korea’s conglomerates went for the quick and easy
route to profits which is buying up real estate or pouring money into stock market speculation,
Bullard et al. (1998).
In addition, South Korea for a long time, kept its status of labor-intensive assembly point
for Japanese inputs using Japanese technology. Most of the machines in industrial plants were
imported from Japan. As a result, South Korea had a trade deficit with Japan and later, the US
which was estimated to $21 billion. Furthermore, competition with other East Asian countries
with cheaper labor put high pressure on South Korea. Bullard et al. (1998) found that all of these
elements, combined with over-expansion and over-specialization, meant that by 1996 the top 20
listed companies in South Korea were earning a mere 3% on assets, while the average costs of
borrowing had risen to 8.2%. In a breakneck attempt to regain trust and profitability, the
parliamentary government tried to enact a series of laws that will enable them to fire labor and
reduce the workforce, similarly like the US style of cutting off extra labor and making the
remaining workforce more productive. Unfortunately, the government decision was ineffective.
The Korean banking became unable to neutralize the impact of foreign capital flows by directing
the funds into safe lending which created an excess of liquidity that spilled over into risky and
speculative investments. By October 1997, it was estimated that non-performing loans by South
Korean enterprises and banking institutions had escalated to over $50 billion. By November
1997, South Korea decided to join Thailand and Indonesia in the queue for an IMF bail-out.
The IMF’s role in Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea went far beyond its role defined
in the Article of Agreement. The consequences of the IMF’s experiences in earlier crises were
proved in its unfolding role in the East Asian debt crisis. As before, the IMF has nicely
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emphasized the internal roots of the problem but has deflected its attention from its earlier
endorsement of these countries policies when they were growing. For example, the IMF was
praising the Thai authorities in the late 1996 for their consistent and robust record of
macroeconomic management policies. The IMF went further and promoted Thailand as a model
of development for the rest of the Third world due to its high growth rate and its openness to
foreign capital flows. These were the signs that fool the IMF and that was the reason why the
IMF failed to predict the East Asian financial debt crisis. Kapur (1998) argued that, the IMF and
the international market claimed that they were shocked to find that the East Asian regime
impressive economic achievements were built on such unsafe foundations. Faced with the
pressing rescue alarm from Indonesia, Thailand, and South Korea, the IMF decided to provide
credit or offer a bail-out package to these countries instead of relying on private banks loans. In
exchange, the IMF imposed a program requiring the Thai, Indonesian, and Korean governments
to reform their financial institutions and to make changes in their economic and political
structures. Based on this statement, Feldstein (1998) said that “The conditions imposed on
Thailand and Indonesia were more like the comprehensive reforms imposed on Russia, including
the recent emphasis on reducing Russian corruption, than like the macroeconomic changes that
were required in Latin America” (p.24).
In Thailand, the government negotiated an agreement with the IMF on 20th of August
1997. In exchange for a $16.7 billion package, later raised to $17.2 billion, the Thai authorities
agreed to stabilization and structural adjustment programs with two principal component
proposed by the IMF. First, the stabilization program would cut the current account deficit
through the maintenance of high interest rates; increase the rate of the value-added tax (VAT) to
10 percent in order to achieve a small surplus in the public sector by 1998; cut government
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expenditure in numerous areas; and cut subsidies on some utilities and petroleum products. The
second part was the structural reform program of the financial sector. This program divided,
suspended, and restructured unviable institutions, took immediate steps to instill confidence in
the rest of the financial system, and imposed strict conditionality on the extension of the
Financial Institutions Development Fund resources in order to restore a healthy financial sector.
At the heart of the structural reform, the IMF stressed on the closing down of 42 finance
companies considered as unviable institutions. This agreement also stated that the $17 billion
will be solely devoted to finance the balance of payment deficit and rebuild the official reserve of
the Thai bank. In other words, this sum cannot be used to bail-out local institutions. Part of this
program required the remaining financial institutions to strengthen their capital base which
included a policy that encouraged foreign capital injection.
On October 1997, the Thai government finally came up with details of the stabilization
program which underlined their commitment to generate a budget surplus equivalent of 1% of
gross domestic product by imposing a series of taxes. These series of taxes included increases on
duties on luxury imports, surcharges on imports not used by the export sector, and a gas tax of
one baht per liter on fuel. On the government side, spending was cut by 100 billion baht bringing
it down to 800 billion baht. On the financial sector reform side, the authorities came up with the
creation of the Financial Restructuring Authority (FRA) to oversee the rehabilitation plans
submitted by the companies that were suspended and closed. The FRA role was to determine
whether or not these companies would be allowed to reopen or remain closed. The government
established also an Asset Management Corporation (AMC) to oversee the disposal of the assets
of the finance companies ordered to be closed. The government promised foreign investors to
own up to 100 percent of financial institutions, tighten rules and provide full government
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guarantees for depositors and creditors, and improve bankruptcy laws to allow creditors to
collect their collateral faster. On December 7th, 1997 the Chuan government announced after the
review of the FRA and AMC that all but two of the 58 finance companies would be closed.
Finally, the IMF money was released. The Chuan government allowed foreign investors to own a
big stake in Thai corporations and foreign banks began again to work out deals with Thai banks.
Nicola Bullard et al. (1998) said that “The Japanese Sanwa Bank announced that it would take a
10% stake in one of the country’s biggest banks, Siam Commercial Bank, a move that would
bring total foreign shareholding in that bank to 35%. Citibank declared that it would move to
gain a 50.1% ownership share in First Bangkok City Bank”(p.512). After the implementation of
all programs required by the IMF, the IMF’s Asia pacific director Herbert Neiss in 1998
admitted that the Thai economy slowed down instead of getting back on track.
In South Korea, the IMF did not wait to respond to their call for assistance. In just one
week after the call, The IMF mission came up with a rescue package of $57 billion. Prakash
(2001) explained that these stand-by credits are comprised $21 billion from the IMF, $10 billion
from the World Bank, $4 billion from the Asian Development Bank and a total of $20 billion
from leading industrial countries, including $10 billion from Japan and $5 billion from the US.
Even with this rescue package, after a week, stock market and currency continued to fall. The
IMF had to come up with a new kind of loan due to the country’s advanced economic state and
tough negotiators. As a result, the IMF came up with a new deal that ensured that South Korea
would avoid default on the $66 billion of the total $120 billion short term foreign debt. The other
lenders (Japan, Germany, and USA) were relieved by the IMF condition imposed on South
Korea because they too were not ready to accept a default given the state of their banking
systems. The IMF invented a new kind of loan, the ‘Supplemental Reserve Facility’ to enable it
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to bypass its normal ruling that financial packages are not allowed to exceed five times the
recipient country’s IMF quota, Bullard et al. (1998).
Like all IMF bail-out agreements, the details of this new deal highlighted the tightening
of fiscal and monetary policies, combined with the reform of the labor market, the opening of
Korean financial sector to US banks and fund managers, the raise of interest rates from 12.5% to
21%, the control of money supply to contain inflation, the increase of the value added tax
(VAT), and the opening of product markets to Japanese goods. In addition, the agreement
included the establishment of an independent central bank which weakened the relation between
the government and the chaebols. One of the outline objectives of the IMF was to destroy the
chaebols which was the foundation of South Korea fabulous economic growth and increasing
global presence. The closing of the chaebols created massive workers lay-off and a declining
productivity which resulted in an anti-government backlash. Bullard et al. mentioned that the
South Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) said that it is the workers, not
government officials or leaders that are responsible for the economic crisis and who will have to
bear the blame of any IMF measures. The agreement also included the closing of bankrupted
financial institutions and allowed foreign banks to establish subsidiaries. Other key reforms were
the approval of foreign entry into the domestic financial sector; trade liberalization, the review of
corporate governance and structure and the capital account liberalization. Just after the Korean
government agreed on these terms, the first installment of cash was offered by the IMF and the
US to the Korean government. Following few weeks after the agreement, the Korean
government realized that the IMF rescue program will not solve the financial problem because
the government was unable to meet its short term debt obligation. Conway and Fischer (2006)
argued that Jeffrey D Sachs accused the IMF of secrecy and noted that, the IMF insisted that all
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candidates had to immediately endorse an agreement they had no part in drafting which meant
they had no time to understand and had no clue on whatsoever they were doing.
Unlike Thailand and South Korea, Indonesia has been reluctant to accept the IMF short
term rescue package. Case (2002) mentioned that “Many elites and members of the middle class
were offended by their country’s evident loss of sovereignty, indeed, the haughtiness with which
conditions seemed to be imposed” (p.54). Despite this reluctance, Suharto’s government
accepted a rescue package of $23 billion from the IMF after agreeing on the loan terms (tight
fiscal and monetary policies, closing of bankrupt financial institutions, liberalizing foreign trade
and investment, reduce export taxes, open more sectors of the economy to foreign investment,
and privatize public enterprises). The IMF bail-out package did little in slowing the falling of the
rupiah and the flow of money out of the country. Bullard et al. (1998) found that the Indonesian
market needed more than the IMF’s intervention to convince it that all was well in the state of
Suharto. Faced with massive unemployment and a rapidly contracting economy, Suharto
proposed a budget as a response to these circumstances. His budget stressed on the increase in
subsidies for petrol, rice, fertilizer, an increase in government spending but did not mention
when and how these subsidies would be abolished. As a result, both the IMF and the
international market disagreed on his budget and decided to send money outside the country and
sell off the currency which hit 17000 rupiah/dollar. The IMF responded to this situation by
proposing a second agreement to Indonesia. In contrast to the first agreement which was set with
macroeconomic objectives, this agreement specified microeconomic objectives. Prakash (2001)
said that what the new deal lacks in macroeconomic targets is made up for in microeconomic
directives which strike at the very heart of Suharto’s economic power, addressing in detail the
dismantling of cartels, monopolies and taxes which directly benefit Suharto. The IMF demanded
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liberalization of trade in agricultural products such as cloves, oranges, and vanilla. On January
2007, the government announced a temporary freeze on debt servicing by Indonesian companies
along with a plan of closing down non-viable banks and sell their assets. Meanwhile, as a result
of this second agreement, the Indonesian economy was burdened with a huge foreign debt
estimated at $140 billion in total, due to the IMF conditions and the collapse of the rupiah which
unfortunately doubled the price of imported goods and food prices. “What was really needed,
they suggested, was the rescheduling of business short-term loan obligations in order that it
could restart production”(Case, 2002, p.54).
Again, Suharto in a desperate effort to attract foreign investors established the currency
board which put him in conflict with the IMF. According to Bullard et al. (1998), the reasons
that motivated Suharto to set up the currency board were those. First it allowed him and his
people to wipe off their foreign debts at 5500 Rupiah rather than 10000 Rupiah. Second, it gave
Suharto some breathing space to reassert his control over the economic policy after the
humiliating acquiescence to the IMF earlier in the year. Finally, the currency board would have
the effect of bringing back foreign exchange into the country from investors that are ready to
reinvest as soon as the rupiah regained its market value. Unfortunately, the IMF disagreed on the
currency board proposed by Suharto. Case (2002) argued that, even though the IMF had
endorsed the currency boards in other crises, it demonstrated that it was inappropriate in
Indonesia because of the country’s poor banking system and diminished foreign exchange
reserve. During that time, Suharto reconsidered his idea of instituting the currency board because
he did not want to break the IMF conditions. From the Indonesian case, there was clearly a
power struggle between the IMF and Suharto over the settlement of the crisis. However,
Suharto’s interest in protecting the Indonesian economy were the same as the IMF interest in
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rebuilding the economy. The only difference between the two was the way each of them wanted
to settle the crisis.
Following the IMF intervention in Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea, it is worth
calling into question the efficacy and appropriateness of the IMF’s economic advice, as well as
the way it operated in resolving the financial crisis. In analyzing the course of its actions in these
countries, we can say that the IMF gave poor advice on how to resolve a private sector financial
crisis such as: encourage lenders and others to lend more money during crises, promise creditors
that they will not lose money, the combination of budget deficit reduction9 and tighter monetary
policy10 which raise unemployment and bring down growth, and poor macroeconomic policies.
In addition, the IMF acted in much the same it did during the Latin-American and the Russian
crises even though the situation in the Asian countries was very different. Instead of urging the
dissolution of capital controls, the IMF began calling for properly sequenced liberalization of
government controls on money flows in and out of these countries. The public sector reforms
(budget cuts, raise in taxes) imposed by the IMF were inappropriate for the circumstances of a
private debt crisis. The public sector reforms in fact contracted the economies instead of bringing
them under control. In Indonesia for example, detailed conditions related to the banking sector
were imposed despite the fund limited expertise in this particular area. Although the IMF argued
that these reforms were necessary to control inflation and stabilize currencies, the reforms that
were implemented in Indonesia for example clearly accelerated the political and economic
tailspin. Bullard et al. (1998) mentioned that, the currency crisis is not the result of Asian
government profligacy. This was a crisis mate mainly in the private, albeit under-regulated,
financial markets.
9

budget deficit reduction: raise taxes and cut government spending
tighter monetary policy: high interest rates and less credit availibity

10
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I think the IMF applied measures that were designed to control and command
government spending instead of focusing on the real issue which was the revival of privatesector. In Thailand and South Korea for example, currencies continued to devalue even after the
IMF interventions which simply means that their economic policies were not tackling the real
problem. The continued expansion of the IMF’s power and mandate is bad for debtor nations and
for the global financial system because the increasing scope of loan conditions means that during
financial crisis, the IMF will take over a country’s decision-making process without any
accountability of the country’s government which can be considered as the violation of the
country’s sovereignty. Further, the IMF did not have a perfect solution to the “moral hazard”
problem that created the crisis. In order to solve this problem, both the borrowers and creditors
should be punished for their unwise investments decisions, but as we have noticed in the Asian
financial crisis only the borrowers were punished and not the creditors. And that is the main
reason why many economists accused the IMF of perpetuating the problem. According to Wang
(2001), the IMF was accused of creating the problem of moral hazard, because both creditors and
debtors who make unwise investment choices are saved from the consequences of their bad
decisions, thus making it more likely that they will reoffend in the future. In Thailand for
example, part of the structural adjustments program required financial institutions to strengthen
their capital base which included a policy that encouraged more foreign capital injection.
Another part of the rescue package was devoted to service the country’s foreign debt incurred by
international private banks. So, we can say that the IMF applied tight fiscal and monetary
policies which were unequally distributed between domestic and foreign interests. In Thailand
and Indonesia for example, domestic firms were left at the mercy of the international market.
The IMF asserted that the bankrupted firms could not be bailed-out but rather closed instead. In
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South Korea, the IMF imposed the closure of chaebols (Hyundai, Samsung) which spearheaded
South Korea’s growth. Feldstein (1998) said that the tight fiscal and monetary requirements
deepened the crisis by squeezing domestic credit and pushing up interest rates which together
depressed growth and raised unemployment. On other words, the IMF permitted foreign
investors the rights to ownership by liberalizing the financial sector and opening more the
economic sector to foreign investors.
It is also important to note that the role of the IMF is to develop a rescue program for a
country in need and not initiate these programs by enforcing economic structural changes and the
notion of institutions. But following the IMF operations in this crisis, it has exceeded its mandate
as defined in the Articles of Agreement and played the role of economic policeman. Feldstein
(1998) said that “the Fund should not use the opportunity of countries being down and out to
override national political processes or impose economic changes that however helpful they may
be, are not necessary to deal with the balance-of-payments problem and are the proper
responsibility of the country’s own political system” (p.28). In other words, nothing about trade
and investment liberalization, privatization, and public sector austerity were mentioned in the
objectives of the institution but have become central when dealing with the Asian financial crisis.
Additionally, the IMF surveillance should not only point to domestic vulnerabilities, but should
also focus on the spillover effects of risks at regional and global levels.
However, the objectives that were mentioned regarding the IMF role of promoting high
levels of employment and real income and the development of productive resources of all
members, we can conclude were failed to be achieved in South Korea, Thailand and Indonesia.
In contrary the IMF initiatives raise unemployment and the poverty rates. I think the IMF should
act as a good monitor to emerging countries by providing its own funds as an indication of its
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support to these emerging countries rather than as a bailout of international lenders in time of
crises. The IMF should also work with emerging countries that have not reached a financial crisis
yet in order to bring them under control by providing good, accurate, and sustainable solutions to
“regional or homegrown crises”. The IMF have to put in place a mechanism to monitor, regulate
and control international financial flow in order to prevent further crises. A concise system
should be established by the IMF for the effective resolution of private sector debt crises based
on clear rules and bankruptcy procedures. This system will give full responsibility to countries to
assume full responsibility for unrecoverable private sector debts. Feldstein (1998) argued that,
the IMF should work with countries that have not yet reached a currency crisis in order to
prevent the large current account deficits or the excess short-term debts that could later
precipitate and quicken a financial crisis.

CONCLUSION
The IMF responses to the East Asian financial crisis were not the best possible responses.
It appears that the IMF has failed in its mission of helping countries in financial distress. Its role
went far beyond what it was supposed to be (lend to countries with balance of payments
difficulties, keep track of the global economy and economies of member countries). The crisis
tested the effectiveness and relevance of the International Monetary Fund responses and we can
say that the IMF policies overall accelerated economic contraction, did not stabilize currencies as
wished and did not restore market confidence. The crisis also demonstrates that the IMF
surveillance framework should be adapted to include economic, political, and social changes that
take place around regions because governments are no longer the main borrowers, private
capitals ventures are more dominant. I personally think that the IMF should go back to its
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original role which is a supportive organization that helps countries in financial distress rather
than changing their political structures and imposing economic reforms. I also think that the IMF
needs to improve their framework for assessing financial market stabilities and reinforce early
warning capabilities in emerging markets countries11 (EMC). The global effect of the crisis
recalls the IMF role to improve the monitoring of cross country spill-over effects12. The IMF
should also provide technical assistance on how the debtors can improve their current account
balance. Feldstein (1998) noted that in deciding whether to insist on a reform, the IMF should
ask two questions: Is this reform really needed to restore the country’s access to international
capital market? Is this a technical matter that does not interfere unnecessarily with the proper
jurisdiction of a sovereign government?

\

11

Emerging market economies are financial markets that are in the transitional phase from developing
countries to developed ones
12
Spill-over effects are positive or negative externalities of economic processes that affect those who are
not directly involved
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